The Peculiar Post Great Depression Protectionism by Rolf Lüders & Gert Wagner
THE  PECULIAR  POST  GREAT  DEPRESSION  PROTECTIONISM
ROLF LÜDERS AND GERT WAGNER*
1. INTRODUCTION
That the early 1930’s brought profound changes in Chile’s commercial
strategy, is part of “conventional wisdom”.  Economic historians generally accept
that after the Great Depression the economic policy of the country shifted from its
up to then “outward” oriented development strategy, into an “ inward looking”,
anti trade policy, which extended over the next four decades.
Judging from trade data, to identify the Great Depression as the dividing
line between the mentioned out and inward looking experiences of Chile seems
plausible.  Total exports reached in 1933 only 38 per cent of its 1926 level.  Compared
to the exceptional 1928-29 years, the fall is even more pronounced, down to 28 per
cent (see Table 1).  Recovery during the 1930’s was slow, remaining during the
whole decade well below the 1929 peak.1
Given such a drastic fall in overall exports, the economy required, no doubt,
a profound increase in the relative price of traded goods.  What characterized
Chilean trade policy from then on and until the mid 1970´s, was not the relative
price change, but the particular policy decisions through which this change was
achieved.  Raising tariffs was one technique, as can be seen in Table 1, but more
complex and discretionary devices, such as quotas, maximum prices, multiple
exchange rates, etc., were also used.  It is the combined presence of all these
instruments which determined trade and price policy in the following decades.  In
this field, more then in most other, the initial reactions to events of the early 1930’s
can be seen as having a profound imprint on later developments.  It is difficult to
imagine the in the 1950’s and 1960’s existing trade institutions, were it not for the
peculiar and, of course, highly inefficient way the above mentioned relative price
change was tackled initially.
After this brief Chilean trade policy overview and based on Lüders and
Wagner (2003) the following section describes the pre depression trade regime
and offers a hypothesis aiming at an explanation of the underlying institutional
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and Wagner (2003) the asymmetry between the behavior of exports of different
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negatively influenced by the long-run evolution of both, the world market for nitrates
and Chilean public policy, copper exports, which also declined sharply with the
depression, had almost completely recovered by the end of the decade.
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equilibrium.  The complexity of objectives behind post depression protectionism
is then described.  Later on the origin and stability of the new policy instruments
brought about by the depression are discussed.  In the last section we come back
to the institutional hypothesis for understanding pre 1930 protectionism,  exploring
if its  underlying  assumptions survive in the post depression period.
TABLE 1
CHILE: GDP, EXPORTS AND TARIFFS, 1928-1940
(1926=100)
Source: based on Díaz, Lüders, Wagner (2003).
The columns “nitrate” and “copper” refer to value of production indices,
that is, production times price indeces.  Almost all production of both these products
was being exported.  The last column represents the average import tariff.
2. THE PRE GREAT DEPRESSION TRADE REGIME
 Chile’s commercial policy at the outbreak of the Great Depression was
based exclusively on custom duties, as it had been during the previous 120 years.2
In 1925 and at a two digit level of industrial classification, the average tariff was
15.8 per cent, ranging from a high of 37 per cent, to a low of 0.07 per cent.  (Figures
2 The so called “outward looking development strategy”, which ended according to
conventional wisdom with the Great Depression, got somehow mixed up with the idea
of free trade.  The former expression is used in the oral tradition, rather then in the
rigorous professional literature, as a rhetorical device to underscore the trade policy
change of the 1930s.  The confusion of an “outward looking development strategy”
with free trade seems is, however, quite common, as witnessed by the surprise expressed
by Coatsworth and Williamson (2002) when discovering tariff levels existing in Latin
America before the Great Depression.  Chile is no exception and pre Great Depression
tariff levels were not only relatively high, they also represented a considerable fraction





1928-1929 124 134 136 187 117
1930 106 93 96 122 136
1931 84 69 40 80 140
1932 71 26 17 33 80
1933 87 38 15 57 137
1934 105 63 22 95 176
1935 111 60 32 91 179
1936 117 71 32 106 177
1937 133 112 36 223 162
1938-1940 138 89 42 176 154
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are based on largest import sectors, in a sample covering 74 per cent of total
imports).  The overall average import tariff, that is total revenues from this source
over total imports, reached 19.2 per cent for 1921-1930 and their standard deviation
was a relatively low 4.64 per cent.  These revenues represented 3.13 per cent of
average GDP, financing about 27 per cent of total fiscal expenditures.
The average tariff of 1931-1940 was 28 per cent, about 50% above the
average of the previous ten years, a dramatic change, and quite consistent with
the idea of a landmark.3  However, in the following decades, the 1940’s ,1950’s and
1960’s, all of which conventional wisdom incorporates into the “inward looking
years”, the average tariff fell back to its pre Great Depression level of the 1920’s.
Why then the talk about protectionism?  Do tariffs charged by customs really
explain the changed character of Chilean trade policy after the Great Depression?
If not, what then stands for it?  The answer to these questions starts  with the
identification of what we consider essential features of the pre Great Depression
commercial policy decision process.  The next step underlines the changes
experienced in the early 1930’s in this field, in particular the introduction of a new
set of policy instruments,  and then goes on exploring how  these innovations
affected the above decision process.
Two institutional factors which characterized the pre-depression commercial
policy making process changed during the 1930s.  In the first 120 years or so of
republican life, tariff changes were the outcome of a public choice process in
which Parliament and the executive branch of government had to reach an
agreement.  This is of course a normal procedure in democratic organizations, but
it has to be stressed that these agreements imply political transaction costs; that
is, tariff changes are expensive under such circumstances.  If one accepts this
price as a restrictive device, the pre Great Depression commercial policy stability in
Chile can then be explained.  Moreover, the tariff approval procedure also helps to
explain the relatively low dispersion of tariffs for different groups of products.
Given the importance of tariff revenues in fiscal accounts - in 1925 tariff revenues
represented a quarter of total fiscal revenues, down from even higher shares in the
previous 100 or so years- significant tariff revenues losses had to be compensated.
Therefore, any bids in favor of prohibitive tariffs on, or exemptions in favor of,
imports of certain goods which were heavily represented in the country’s imports,
were not easily approved, because they  would require compensatory taxation.
Another feature characterizing the “old“ way of doing commercial policy
was that the executive branch of government, although interested in charging
tariffs, prevented these to be excessively high or too dispersed. This was also a
consequence of the mentioned high relative weight of tariff revenues in total fiscal
revenues, which induced the Executive to “maximize” or at least not dilapidate,
such revenue source. Any tariff innovation was therefore carefully evaluated by
3 The country did not switch at one point in time from completely free trade to a high
level of protectionism, nor did protectionism begin at any one moment during the
Great Depression.  In particular the new tariff law of 1928 already had amplified
goverments capacity for discretionary commercial policy changes.
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the Executive with respect to its fiscal consequences.  In particular and as any
monopolist knows, “high” surcharges may be far from the optimum, while cero or
very low rates do not generate much income.  Therefore the relatively low tariff
dispersion found in Chile before the Great Depression.4
In synthesis the pre Great Depression political decision scenario can be
characterised by the following:
(i) tariff is the only policy instrument.
(ii) maximum to average tariff levels are below  or within the range of two or
three.
(iii) tariff structure is relatively stable; changes require laws, and they are
expensive
 This context would change dramatically as a consequence, we argue, of
policy options opened up by the change in monetary regime: the loss of gold´s
anchor which comes with the depression.  The next section present the mix of
policy objectives which describe the complex protectionism arriving with the Great
Deppression and the following centers on the stability of the policy instruments
which came with the depression.
3. RESTRICTIVE TRADE POLICIES AS PAR T OF A COMPLEX PUBLIC POLICY MIX
The so called “inward looking development strategy” is a public policy
program which in Chile was initiated in the early years of the Great Depression,
which consisted of a peculiar mix of commercial, price and industrial policies.
Often also identified simply as “protectionism”5, the experience lasted for more
then four decades. (Wagner 2003)
But “protectionism”, understood as a set of public policies aiming to achieve
a specific structure of production and a defined factor income relationship, obtained
through trade restricting devices, only partially covers the mix of regulations implicit
in Chile’s “inward looking development strategy”.  Direct price management of
4 Some deviation from the described model took already place in the late 1920’s, when
the new tariff code of 1928 conferred special discretionary powers to the President of
the Republic to change tariffs in certain cases without further consultation to Parliament.
This of course lowered the “price” of tariff changes, as argued above.  This procedural
change was probably the consequence of the growing feeling that potential market
failures existed everywhere and that the State and in particular its Executive, had to be
given more power to regulate and intervene the economy.  At the same time, the
relative importance of tariff revenue in fiscal income was diminishing, so that this
stabilizing factor was also weakening.  The Great Depression had a powerful impact on
the set of factors commented upon in this section, but it should not forgotten that this
occured in a dynamic context, where changes of the “old” model were already taking
place.
5 Much of empirical and analytical work related to this development strategy was developed
by researchers specializing in the field of international economics, exploring and
quantifying its quite evident trade restricting and resource allocating distorting features.
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specific goods, at some times with the apparent objective of putting a brake on
inflation but at others with the more precise idea of benefiting consumers, especially
when referred to classical “wage goods”, intermingles constantly with the more
direct and traditional notion of protectionism 6.
Moreover, state interventions into the country’s investment structure were
added.  This was done through two channels, investment in public enterprises and
credit management.  Through the latter governments induced the centrally planned
private investment composition.  By the end of the 1930’s the Chilean development
corporation, CORFO, came into existence and much of capital accumulation in
manufacturing and public utilities –aimed directly or indirectly at import substituting
activities- was either done or influenced by this agency.  Imported goods required
by public accumulation and the foreign inputs into the production process this
capital helped to demand, in many ocassions imposed discriminatory treatments in
their favour, introducing additional complexity into  the commercial policy.
All these policy measures could, of course, be considered simply as random
interferences with the free market resource allocation mechanism.  However, the
distinction among different objectives and policies is necessary to understand
this complex public policy program.  If this is done, the peculiar mix which was
adopted between 1930 and the early 1970´s, more than the result of a single, inte-
gral and balanced planning effort, and beyond the outcome of pure constructivism,
may be seen as a complex and mutating set of regulations and interventions
accumulating through time, stemming from public agencies many times quite
independent one from another, and often inspired by apparently unrelated
objectives.  Complex time dependency path’s developed, influenced by unexpected
or undesired consequences of previously adopted policies, which then triggered
new interventions.
4. COMMERCIAL P OLICY  FROM  THE G REAT DEPRESSION O NWARDS:
INSTRUMENTS AND STABILITY
 Early during the Great Depression, once the sharp export reduction and
severe financial restriction became evident, Chile abandoned the gold standard
and increased import tariffs.  As a result, decisions were taken away from the
market and transferred to the executive branch of government.7  Chile had been off
6 The rhetorical distinction between real and monetary  phenomena might be considered
somewhat  outmoded, but for the sake of illustrating   the peculiar policy mix developed
by Chile  we could say it constitutes a case where money is no longer a pure veil and
commercial and industrial objectives of  government  interplay with goals expressed in
terms of  money prices of specific goods.
7 The new constitution of  1925  curtails Congress’ powers. Among others it took away
the legislative approval of money emissions (authorizations) transferring  it to  Cen-
tral Bank. In  the beginning  its directors came also from Congress but thru time the
executive acquired more and more  decision power.
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gold for over five decades, except for a three year period late in the XIXth Century
and in 1925-1931.  Therefore, were it not for the following two new elements,
Chile´s decision to abandon the gold standard would not have implied a really new
scenario.  However, the breakdown of the international monetary and trading
systems generated a new environment for Chile’s public policy makers, in which
benefits to be derived from gold’s anonymous discipline lost appeal in relation to
“visible hand” type interventions.  In addition, of course, the non discretionary
gold anchor was lost for monetary policy purposes.
Benefits to be obtained from a network good like the adherence to a money
standard, are positively related to the number of consumers.  That is, the generalized
repeal of gold may be understood as a loss of weight by defendants of monetary
discipline in Chilean public discussions.  As a result, traditional restrictions on
money’s expansion were weakened or simply disappeared, but the emerging scenario
also facilitated new and formerly unknown management opportunities of foreign
exchange.  Whatever the reason, the fact is that soon authorities found out that
the new paper standard provided fresh opportunities for trade regulation through
multiple exchange rates and direct exchange managements.  These instruments
opened up the door for interfering in new ways with relative price formation; they
also provided new channels for export taxation and eventually for generating
fiscal revenue.8  These institutional innovations, accompanied by new actors in
the decision scenario, opened up the road for new outcomes in trade regulation.9
Initially the depression was faced by a combination of (i) a substancial
increace in tariffs charged by customs; (ii) adoption of multiple exchange rates and
(iii) direct exchange allocation to specific imports.  Only the first instrument required
explicit approval by Parliament; the other two were administered by the executive
with little or none legal instruction for specific action, besides the objetive of
aggregate equilibrium of foreign accounts.  Taking tariffs as given, the executive
could now determine the level and structure of protection, and also the time span
over which a given set prevails. Innovations could be imposed any time.
The underlying dynamics of protection turned out to be a complex
interrelation of different forces.  One, government objectives might change through
time, conditioning in this way the specific use of policy instruments.  Two, inflation,
in itself a phenomena exacerbated by institutional changes triggered by the Great
8 It is easily appreciated  that all these instruments and new regulations can be seen as
different aspects of the same overall system of trade reduction.
9 These instruments were probably perceived as   practical solutions to tough public
policy challenges but, was Chile prepared for recognizing the implicit cost of their
potential long run incidence? Answering this  we are not prepared for,  but the possibility
that social capital pertaining to  their rationality should have been scarce cannot be
dismissed, and the  bureaucracy in charge of administering at the executive branch of
government might not have had the perception, experience and knowledge of traditional
gold experts.  The new policy instruments may be seen as negative technological
innovations, were consequences to be appreciated in the long run were not  present at
the decision process in the early 30’s when adopted.  Alternatively actors may have
thought that getting rid of them once the depression  had finished is an easy task.
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Depression, depreciates the real price of imported goods and their substitutes, for
any given structure of nominal exchange rates.  In practice and for a long period,
the range between the maximum and minimum fixed exchange rates increased,
mainly due to maintenance of its lowest level and to increases, in variable
proportions, of higher rates. But, three, also tariffs charged by customs experienced
frequent changes; on the one hand, tariff increases were legislated, and on the
other effective tariffs were reduced through different channels starting with
exemptions decreed by the President of the Republic, be it for stimulating production
of certain goods -reductions of tariffs on intermediate imports- or for the sake of
price controls of politically sensible items.  Four, bilateral agreements, quite frequent
in those years, were in general agreements for discriminatory tariff reductions.  In
addition, five, new domestic legislation created a variety of “special trade regimes”,
lowering taxes and tariffs for imports into extreme regions and for certain industries.
In synthesis, starting with the Great Depression commercial policy was
implemented using a set of highly unstable instruments to ration imports.  In other
words, a set of tools which and for different reasons, required constant management
and adaptation by the authorities, was used to implement that policy.  But it is
important to notice that this inherent instability in the use of the instruments did
not translate into chaotic investment and disinvestment in different industries.
This turned out to be so, because one of the important aims of commercial policy
was to maintain and even enhance domestic production of goods, producers could
expect  that the system would make sure that they at least survived.  Once
production of a given good started, producer were almost assured that the process
would go on forever.
But this did not mean that, for example, new technology could easily be
introduced or quality improved, if those activities somehow fell outside regulators
-planers- concept of the “correct” production function.  The capacity of the
commercial system for permitting adaptation to new circumstances at industry
level was therefore quite limited.
Before going on with the discussion of how these new instruments changed
the decision scenario in matters of commercial policy, some evidence on the intensity
of their utilization is presented.  Obtaining such measures required considerable
effort for authors and are the first attempts for translating the complex set of
commercial regulations into a synthetic implicit tariff are estimations disposable
for the early 1960´s.  The averege implicit tariff generated by these calculations are
roughly in the range of three times the averege tariff collected by customs.  In
other words, about 75% of the average protectionism was generated by non
traditional means, that is non revenue raising tariffs.10  Our best guess is that this
proportion also accounts for the 1950´s and 1940´s; but it is possible that during
the 1930´s this proportion could have been somewhat lower, mainly because tariffs
were higher.
10 For some sub period in the 1930’s and 1940’s differences made in exchange transactions
were explicitly registered in fiscal accounts; but in most cases those differences translate
directly into some sort of subsidy or direct investment.
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This  magnitude is important for two reasons.  First , it provides the necessary
evidence for the existence of an intense type of protectionism.  It is precisely these
new post 1930 policy instruments which account for the real difference between
pre and post Great Depression protectionism, representing the quantitative
dimension behind the intuitive distinction among  “inward looking” and  “outward
looking” development strategies.  But also, this proportion between  new and old
instruments reveals significant changes in commercial policy options after 1930.
5. GOVERNMENTS INTEREST IN COMPLEX PROTECTIONISM
 The Great Depression introduced huge changes into the commercial policy
public choice process.  Does this mean that the underlying model we visualize for
the pre-depression decades –the executive government branch maximizes fiscal
income subject to parliament approval– completely disappears with the
phenomena?  We argue that even if conditions and the relative power of actors
changed, the underlying assumptions sustaining the model are maintained.
Moreover, it is the same model that facilitates the understanding  of  post depression
protectionism.
Assume that the direct political objective is public action, where action
stands for expenditure but also for other types of interventions, be they of the
regulatory kind or  providing some sort of redistribution.  Also assume that tariffs
and taxes in itself do not add nothing positive to governments popularity, but
action in itself does.  The point is that in the pre Great Depression context the only
way for government to obtain political benefits  from commercial policy changes,
required raising revenue through tariffs and in this way  getting access to fiscal
expenditure, more or less the only possible  accepted action.
The new policy instruments introduced with the Great Depression implied
that political benefits for the executive may now be obtained directly through the
assignment of specific exchange rates to particular imports, distribution of quotas,
tariff exemptions, access to special exchange rates, etc.  Moreover, formerly
expenditures needed to be approved by both the executive and parliament,
meanwhile direct action based on some of these new instruments does not require
such a transaction11.
In this interpretation, the underlying motivation of government is the same
as before, but it is the new instruments and circumstances which changed procedures
and outcomes.  They broadened the range of possible public actions, which means
that there were now more products capable of generating benefits for government,
while the political price to be paid by the executive was reduced.  The price to
government was lower after 1930, not only because transaction costs with
parliament could now be avoided, but also due the fact that the new instruments,
11 Of course, this should be understood as a movement in a scale of grays since the need
for  political compromise cannot be dismissed as easily.  But for the sake of the
presentation we rest here with our argument.
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contrary to taxes, generated negative effects which were not easily perceived by
the public.
Additionally and as discussed in a previous section, many of these new
instruments not only do require, but also permit frequent revision.  Employment of
a particular instrument in a given sector or industry in, say one particular year,
does not preclude its employment next year in the same or other industry.
Let us also mention that tariff dispersion was not penalized after 1930, while
it was before that date.  A very high implicit overall protection rate, and extremes
rates in fact exceeded 700%, might have produced benefits for government, even
so it did not generate any fiscal income at all.
Benefits for government stemming from what we here call commercial policy
induced public action, were directly derived from benefits obtained through these
devices by private agents.  These benefits  may be seen as the distribution of
private goods to selected persons.  If this is the case, who is paying for the
product, and why is it that these  payments do not enter negatively into the
governments benefit function?  The underlying assumption is that private benefits
are heavily concentrated and perceived only by few actors.  Payments which make
these benefits for a few possible, are instead broadly distributed over the whole
society and tend to be more or less impossible to perceive by any particular indi-
vidual.  That such policies do have a welfare cost is more or less obvious for
economic thinking today, but the discussion of this aspect exceeds our present
goal.
6. FINAL REMARKS
 Protectionism, understood simply as tariffs on trade, dates back to the
beginnings of the Chilean Republic in the early XIXth Century, but with the Great
Depression a completely new variety of protectionism was born in the country,
where non conventional instruments made most of the difference with past
experience.  This aggressive type of protectionism was made possible by the
breakdown of the gold standard, the emergence of a wide variety of money
standards around the world, and the granting to the Central Bank of broad and
discretionarry issuing powers.  It is this close relation between relative price
decisions and their implementation using instruments provided by the emerging
monetary system, which confers the post Great Depression protectionism its pe-
culiar characteristic.  It is in this realm where the defining moment hypothesis
pertaining to the Great Depression’s incidence on Chilean development can be
considered fully accountable, throwing also new light on the historical importance
of gold’s collapse.
In the early 1950’s, once the long lasting depression of world trade initiated
in the early 1930s and continued by the effects of World War II, ended, the strongly
protectionist Chilean economic system, and its pillars, survived, in spite of the fact
that a rapidly growing international trade volumen presumably must have offered
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interesting trade opportunities for Chilean business.  Institutions and organizations
characterizing this system, as well as interests associated to the peculiar resource
allocation it engenderd, had become healthy and strong enough to resist any
change.  Moreover, its peculiar instruments not only inhibited any change, but
their complex nature clouded the perception of their efficiency costs, thereby
reducing or eliminating pressures to get rid of them.  A radical change only came
about in the early 1970s, as a result of a mayor economic, social and political crisis,
to which the messy system here described no doubt contributed to.
What sustained Chile’s “inward looking development policies?  The obvious
candidate and  the one getting most attention in the literature is of course “interest
groups”, that is owners of specific factors which without such a policy might have
suffered significant capital losses. But it is our contention that we have added a
second and permanently interested actor: Government itself, who also wants to
avoid change.
It is therefore not surprising to find that protectionism, as implemented in
Chile in 1930-1974, only began to fall apart once the whole economic, social and
political system broke completely down at the end of that period.
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